Populism and Constitutionalism: Analyzing Judicial Appointment Reforms in India and Israel

Abstract

This article explores the intersection of constitutionalism and populism through a comparative analysis of judicial independence in India, and Israel. By examining the judicial reforms in these nations, it highlights the tensions between populist governments and the judiciary, a key institution in liberal democracies. The study underscores how populist leaders, driven by majoritarian mandates, often attempt to weaken judicial checks to consolidate power, which threatens the foundational principles of constitutionalism. In Hungary and Poland, populist regimes have successfully undermined judicial independence through legislative reforms, while in India, attempts to alter judicial appointments were thwarted by the Supreme Court invoking the “basic structure” doctrine. Israel presents a more complex scenario where incremental changes in the judicial appointments process, although not immediately threatening, suggest a gradual erosion of judicial autonomy. The article argues that while populism presents significant challenges to constitutionalism, the resilience of judicial institutions varies across contexts. It calls for enhanced transparency, stronger constitutional safeguards, and global cooperation to protect judicial independence. This comparative study provides critical insights into how different legal frameworks respond to populist pressures, offering a roadmap for safeguarding constitutional democracy in an era of rising populism.