Introduction
The inauguration of the first phase of the Navi Mumbai International Airport (“NMIA”) on September 30, 2025, together with the enforcement of the Bhartiya Vayuyan Vidheyak Bill 2024 (“2024 Act”), marks the beginning of a new and promising era for India’s aviation sector. The 2024 Act is created to fix shortcomings of the nearly century-old Aircraft Act, 1934 (“1934 Act”), which was amended twenty-one times to enhance safety, oversight, and alignment with international conventions. Over time, ambiguities and redundancies have emerged, affecting stakeholders and ease of business, leading to the enactment of this , aligning with the Standards and Recommended Practices outlined by the ICAO.
The 2024 Act marks a significant step forward but is not without flaws and will undergo intense scrutiny in the coming period. Further examination of the Act through critical study shows multiple areas where provisions create uncertainties due to a lack of clearer explanations.
Through this blog, the authors argue that the 2024 Act, despite its modernizing goals, is a Pandora’s box of legal puzzles which could create a vicious cycle of injustice for the affected people. To illustrate this, the blog firstly outlines the concerns raised by the blanket ban on slaughter activities, traces the potential journey of a slaughterhouse owner whose business is threatened by the Act’s blanket ban, which unveils the hidden pitfalls of the 2024 Act and how these seemingly separate provisions interlock to block paths to justice. Building on this analysis, the blog suggests targeted reforms to bridge these legislative gaps. Lastly, the blog provides a conclusion that encompasses a summary and some suggestions to move forward and ahead.
The Blanket Ban: A Disproportionate Measure?
The quandary lies under Section 10(2)(zb) of the 2024 Act, which prevents the slaughter of animals and disposal of waste products within a 10 kilometers (“kms”) radius around the aerodrome reference point. The issue lies in the former part of the provision, putting a blanket ban on slaughtering and flaying of animals, which signifies that there can be no slaughterhouse or meat shops within a 10 kms radius, directly affecting the individuals engaged in such activity, which forms the basic source of livelihood for them. Such a blanket ban on slaughterhouses raises the question of proportionality. In the case of State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat, the Supreme Court also emphasized the need for thorough proportionality analysis on the banning of slaughter activity. After the implementation of the 2024 Act, the slaughterhouses which already exist within a 10 kms radius may be demolished by the Central Government, which can be implied from section 18(1)(a) and can be substantiated with the forthcoming inauguration of the Navi Mumbai International Airport, with the Government prohibiting the slaughter activities within the 10 kms radius.
The approach adopted by the 2024 Act differs from the standard practices across the world. ICAO, for instance, recommends the adoption of an adaptive, scientific strategy for wildlife hazard management instead of a fixed-radius ban on slaughtering operations, as can be seen in the case of Airports of Changi in Singapore, which tackles this issue by employing the tools of advanced waste management and habitat modification without entirely displacing meat processing units.
Nevertheless, it can be said that in negative or limited governance administrative model, it might seem more effective to introduce a mere ban as compared to control and surveillance of the work of the slaughterhouses. Although this strategy saves on administration, it does not consider the constitutional requirement of proportionality and least restrictive means. Coexistence of livelihood and public safety rights is made possible by regulation via waste management standards, licensing and systematic monitoring. Equity is lost and vulnerable economic groups are disproportionately hurt by a blanket prohibition, which even though easier to enforce, makes governance look coercive instead of facilitative.
Compensation Without Rehabilitation: An Incomplete Remedy
The demolition of the existing slaughterhouses poses the question of rehabilitation and compensation. Chapter VI of the 2024 Act articulates about the ‘payment of compensation for loss or damage’; however, the act does not whatsoever about ‘Rehabilitation’, due to which their ‘Right to Livelihood’ was hampered, which was recognized as a fundamental right in the case of Olga Telis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors. Monetary compensation often fails to secure the right to livelihood as it converts the value of land into its monetary equivalent, treating human livelihoods as mere quantifiable assets, overlooking the fact that land and money capital require a distinct set of knowledge for their utilization. Furthermore, people engaged in slaughterhouses possess focused skills and time-honored market networks, forming a complex ecosystem that monetary compensation alone cannot reinstate. Providing only compensation in the 2024 Act, without a robust rehabilitation plan, would be a step backward undermining the stance taken by the Supreme Court highlighting the need of incorporating the guiding principles of equality, equity, and justice for compensation and the core principles of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (“LARR, 2013”).
A Vicious Cycle of Injustice: What Happens When a Slaughterhouse Owner Challenges the System?
To see how the Act’s flaws interconnect, consider a small business owner who operates a slaughterhouse within a 10 kms radius of an airport. Upon the Act’s enforcement, they receive a demolition notice based on the blanket ban in Section 10(2)(zb) and are offered compensation that doesn’t include rehabilitation for their lost livelihood. Here is how their pursuit of justice would be carried forward.
Firstly, the Arbitration flaw; believing the compensation is inadequate, the owner contests the amount. They are then subjected to the arbitration process under Section 22 where the central government shall have the unilateral power to appoint the arbitrator, which has been underscored by the Supreme Court in the case of Central Organization for Railway Electrification vs M/s ECI SPIC SMO MCML (JV), where the court has expressly stated that the unilateral appointment of an arbitrator by one party creates a hurdle in terms of independence and impartially of that arbitrator in so far as Article 14 of the Constitution of India guarantees the right of equality.
Secondly, the Appeal flaw; if the owner wishes to appeal the original demolition order from a body like the DGCA, they encounter the next trap in section 33, which establishes the appeal hierarchy, stating that any appeal against an order issued by the Director General of Civil Aviation (“DGCA”) or the Director General of the Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (“BCAS”) must be made to the central government. The central government maintains authority to make decisions that become unappealable in all cases. The central government has the power to appoint both the DGCA and BCAS Director General according to Sections 3(1) and 5(1) of this Act, which may undermine the independence of the regulatory bodies. The central government’s authority in this matter lacks any further appeal process while simultaneously eliminating judicial review protections as a necessary safeguard.
Thirdly, the Rule-Making flaw; The entire process is underpinned by the government’s arbitrary power in section 35. The government could frame rules for immediate demolition while Parliament is not in session. Even if Parliament later rejects these rules, the Act states that any action already taken under them remains valid. Therefore, the owner’s slaughterhouse could be demolished based on a rule that is later deemed unfair, leaving them with no remedy because the destructive action is irreversible.
In this scenario, the initial injustice of the slaughterhouse ban isn’t an isolated problem. It is cemented by a series of procedural traps, a biased arbitration process, a self-serving appellate structure, and unchecked executive power that create a vicious cycle where every path to justice is systematically blocked by the Act itself.
Bridging Legislative Gaps in Aviation Law: A Reform-Oriented Approach
Firstly, concerning the infirmity with section 10(2)(zb) of the 2024 Act, the authors suggest that the government must conduct a scientific impact assessment to ascertain the substantial risk posed by slaughterhouses to the aviation industry. The act, rather than a total ban, should adopt a risk-based zonal approach, which connotes that if in any area the risk is lower than the blanket ten kms ban is not justifiable. The act must also promote the adoption of scientific strategies compared to that of targeted habitat modification and long-range acoustic devices employed in the case of Changi Airport in Singapore. Therefore, the act must consider urban compactness, the nature of activities, and, imperatively, the magnitude of the airport. Furthermore, the act must explicitly provide a framework based on LARR, 2013 for rehabilitation of affected individuals so that their fundamental right is not infringed.
Concerning the issue with section 22 of the 2024 Act, the authors suggest that the Act should mandate a neutral arbitration panel for the appointment of arbitrators. Furthermore, the government should reconsider establishing a separate and specialised Aviation Arbitration Tribunal with the technical and legal expertise required to provide for an easy and effective disposal of arbitration-related cases.
In connection with the lacuna under section 33, the authors suggest that the appeals against judgments passed by the DGCA or BCAS should be appealed under the High Court or an independent aviation tribunal, which should be established for this, rather than the central government.
With respect to the issue with section 35, the authors suggest that the pre-publication & stakeholder consultation for any modification or creation of new rules can provide for the much-needed transparency in the mechanism. To ensure parliamentary oversight, there should be prior approval by the parliament for any rules that have a considerable impact on fundamental rights, commercial interests, or regulatory frameworks. Moreover, the decision taken by the parliament in case of any modification or annulment of rules should be made to have a retrospective effect to tighten the rope around the unchecked rulemaking power of the central government.
Conclusion
The Bhartiya Vayuyan Vidheyak, 2024, showcases India’s vision for the modernisation of the aviation industry; however, the act is not fool proof but rather has certain lacunas that need to be addressed for better optimisation of the act. The blanket ban on slaughterhouses within a 10 kms radius from the aerodrome reference point is without any scientific explanation, which ultimately threatens livelihood and calls for a risk-based zonal approach. When the central government unilaterally selects an arbitrator, this undermines fair arbitral proceedings, so a neutral arbitration panel becomes essential. The restrictive nature of the appeal mechanism in the act that gives power to the central government over arbitration decisions impedes judicial review and emphasises the necessity for an independent aviation tribunal. The unchecked rulemaking powers under Section 35 hinder transparency and adaptability, creating a system that lacks accountability.
In a conference organised by the Aeronautical Society of India, the aviation minister mentioned that the government is planning to increase domestic production and air transport. Also, fifty new airports are going to be constructed in the next five years, as India aims to become a global aviation hub, it must ground its progress in scientific reasoning, legal fairness, and inclusive development to safeguard citizen rights, rather than a reliance on arbitrary rules.
